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May 2021
Abstract: International standards in the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) are
increasingly guided by bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements (PTAs). In this paper,
we estimate the effect of these IP-related PTAs on US offshoring behavior in developing countries.
We utilize a difference-in-difference empirical methodology that addresses several possible sources
of endogeneity and exploits industry variation in the importance of IPRs to identify the effect of
these PTA-induced IPR reforms. We find that IP-related PTAs are associated with a substantial
increase in US offshoring in IPR-intensive industries relative to non-IPR-intensive industries. This
increase occurs both within the boundaries of the multinational firm and through arm’s-length
contracts with domestic firms. We do not find strong evidence for a compositional shift towards
either type of offshoring. These findings provide direct empirical evidence that PTA-induced IPR
reform stimulates multinational activity in developing countries.
Keywords: Intellectual property rights; Patents; Preferential trade agreements; Offshoring; Out-
sourcing; Subcontracting; Multinational firms
JEL Classification: F13; F23; O33; O34
∗The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors only and do not necessarily represent those of Caixa-
Bank.
†CaixaBank, Spain
‡Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY, USA. Email: kleinm5@rpi.edu
§Union College, Schenectady, NY, USA. Email: senerm@union.edu
1 Introduction
The past three decades have witnessed a fundamental shift in the international regulation
of intellectual property rights (IPRs) into the realm of multilateral trade system. Following a
concerted lobbying effort by several developed countries, the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations
introduced the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement into the
framework of the newly created WTO. Unprecedented in its scope, the TRIPS Agreement required
all WTO member countries to adhere to a common set of minimum standards in the regulation
and legal protection of patents, copyrights, and trademarks.1
Many developing countries fiercely opposed the institutional reforms mandated by TRIPS, ar-
guing that imposing stronger IPRs would reduce access to technological innovations and increase
the monopoly rents of IP holding multinational firms (MNFs) based in developed countries. Pro-
ponents of TRIPS countered that a more secure international IPRs regulatory environment would
stimulate MNF investment and technology transfer overseas. While the overall economic impact
of TRIPS remains contested, key elements of its central justification have enjoyed support from
a large body of empirical literature. Numerous studies have concluded that TRIPS related IPR
reforms in developing countries have generated increased trade flows (Delgado et al., 2013), techno-
logical licensing (Ivus et al., 2017), and MNF activity including investment, R&D, and offshoring
(Branstetter et al., 2006, 2011; Canals and Şener, 2014; Naghavi et al., 2015; Klein, 2018).
Armed with this evidence, developed countries continued to push aggressively for international
standards in IPRs beyond TRIPS requirements. With gridlock in WTO negotiations in the years
following TRIPS, developed countries turned to bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) with developing countries to secure commitments to strengthen IPRs. Throughout the early
21st century, the US, EU, and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) each signed several PTAs
with developing countries that included chapters related to IPRs specifying so-called “TRIPS-plus”
standards. These routinely include requirements for strengthened patent protection, enhanced
penalties for trademark infringement, and more comprehensive copyright protection for digital
goods (Kohl et al., 2016; Campi and Dueñas, 2019). Moreover, these agreements remove much of
the legal flexibility afforded to developing countries under TRIPS (Sell, 2010). As a consequence, IP-
related PTAs are “increasingly guiding the design of IPRs systems and strengthening IP protection
worldwide, despite being, in principle, a trade policy” (Campi and Dueñas, 2019).
Indeed, the relevance of IP-related PTAs has been highlighted during the long trade dispute
between the US and China that began in 2018 and resulted in the imposition of tariffs on large
imports flows during 2018 and 2019. In January 2020, the two sides signed a preliminary phase
one trade deal. In addition to tariff reductions and China’s commitment to substantially increase
its purchases of US goods and services, the entire first chapter of the agreement is devoted to IPR
protections. Specifically, the agreement requires that China strengthen its intellectual property
1The TRIPS Agreement was officially implemented by the WTO in 1995, and allowed a minimum 5-year transition
period for member countries. For further a comprehensive overview of the timing and requirements of TRIPS, see
Maskus (2000).
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rights regime along several dimensions including: broadening the scope of business information
under the protection of existing trade secret regulations, extending patent duration in cases of
delays to patent issuance, and increasing enforcement of counterfeit products sold on e-commerce
platforms.2 As this trade dispute continues, IPR considerations are expected to remain critical.
Despite their importance to the international IPRs regulatory regime, the economic impact of
the IPR reforms required by PTAs has received little empirical attention. Three notable exceptions
are Maskus and Ridley (2016), Ridley (2018) and Campi and Dueñas (2019), which all examine the
effect of these IPR reforms on bilateral trade flows. These analyses find that the IPR requirements
included in PTAs are associated with a significant increase in the trade of IP-intensive products.
However, it remains unclear if the same broad set of economic effects observed following TRIPS
apply to the PTA-induced IPR reform in developing countries. As Campi and Dueñas (2019)
argue, it is unlikely that the benefits to developing countries of increased trade alone offset the
considerable costs associated with strengthening IPRs to meet TRIPS-plus standards. To the best
of our knowledge, a key channel of benefits used to justify TRIPS-related reforms, namely expanded
MNF activity, has not yet been analyzed in the context of IPR reform required by PTAs.
In this paper, we begin to fill this gap by examining the relationship between IP-related PTAs
with developing countries and US MNF intra-industry offshoring intensity. First, we identify 25
developing countries that implemented an IP-related PTA at some point during the post-TRIPS
period of 2002-2012 with the US, EU or EFTA using data from Kohl et al. (2016) and Maskus
and Ridley (2016). Next, we construct three different measures of industry level US offshoring to
each reforming country. We define total offshoring intensity as the value of intermediate goods
that a US industry imports from the same industry of a foreign country to produce one dollar
worth of output, following the methodology in Canals and Şener (2014). Then, we decompose total
offshoring into related and non-related party offshoring based on whether the offshoring activity
takes place within the boundaries of the firm or through arm’s-length contracts with local firms.
This decomposition allows us to separately estimate the effect of IP-related PTAs on both the total
intensity and composition of US offshoring to reforming countries.
We employ an econometric methodology that addresses several common challenges to identifying
the effect of IPR reforms in developing countries. First, since IPR reforms in developing countries
are typically implemented as part of a broader set of concurrent policy changes, it is difficult to
isolate the effect of IPRs from the confounding effects of other policies. We address this concern by
exploiting industry level variation in the importance of IPRs to US MNFs based on the reported
intellectual property usage of US firms in surveys conducted by the National Science Foundation.
Specifically, we estimate the differential effect on offshoring in IPR intensive (High-IP) versus
non-IPR-intensive (Low-IP) industries before and after an IP-related PTA takes effect using a
difference-in-difference empirical framework. In addition, we follow Bilir (2014) and Maskus and
Yang (2018) and estimate versions of all our regressions that include country-year pair fixed effects.
2 Full text of the agreement can be accessed at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/
phase%20one%20agreement/Economic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between_The_United_States_And_China_Text.pdf
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In this way, we account for the impact of any concurrent policy changes that have a common effect
across industries.
Second, there is the potential for endogeneity if developing countries select into an IP-related
PTA because of factors related to their relationship with US offshoring. We address this concern in
two ways. First, we consider an identification strategy in the spirit of Ridley (2018). In particular,
we include estimates of all specifications using a restricted sample that excludes countries that sign
an IP-related PTA with the US. Thus, the restricted sample consists of countries that sign PTAs
with only the EU, EFTA, or both. In other words, these countries have signed a non-US PTA.
We argue that a country’s selection into a non-US PTA is unlikely to be driven by its existing
or projected offshoring relationship with the US. Nonetheless, under the TRIPS agreement, the
reforms implemented as part of a non-US PTA will still affect the IPR policy faced by US firms.
Finally, we corroborate our main results using an event study framework following Branstetter
et al. (2006), Canals and Şener (2014), and Ivus and Park (2019). We show that US offshoring to
High-IP and Low-IP industries exhibit similar trends in the years leading up to a PTA, followed
by a clear divergence in trends in the post-PTA period. This finding further alleviates concern
that our results reflect pre-existing industry-level trends in offshoring that may be unrelated to
PTA-induced reform.
Our main empirical findings show that IP-related PTAs do not exert any significant effect on US
offshoring in a typical industry. However, we find a substantial differential effect in High-IP versus
Low-IP industries. We estimate that IP-related PTAs are associated with a 43.5% increase in total
offshoring in High-IP industries relative to a statistically insignificant 11.3% decrease in Low-IP
industries. Similarly, our main findings show that IP-related PTAs are associated with a 36.0%
increase in related party offshoring in High-IP industries (at a significance level close to marginal
significance) relative to the insignificant 12.3% decline in Low-IP industries. We also find that non-
related party offshoring increases by about 38.3% in High-IP industries relative to the insignificant
8.4% decline in Low-IP industries. Moreover, we continue to find significant evidence that IP-
related PTAs are associated with substantial relative increases in all three types of offshoring
in High-IP industries under a number of alternate specifications. These include estimates from
regressions using different approaches to classifying industries as IP intensive, and from an event
study framework that explores the timing of changes to offshoring.
Interestingly, we do not find strong evidence that IP-related PTAs impact the composition of
US offshoring in High-IP industries. That is, both related party and non-related party offshoring
increase following an IP-related PTA, but their share of the corresponding total offshoring remain
similar. In some specifications, we find evidence for a compositional shift towards related party
offshoring, but the magnitude of the effect is relatively small (related party offshoring accounts for
an approximately 3% larger share after the PTA takes effect). On the other hand, the absence
of a strong compositional effect is in line with a growing theoretical literature that has identified
competing effects and yielded ambiguous theoretical predictions (Ivus et al., 2016; Biancini and
Bombarda, 2021; Kukharskyy, 2020). Moreover, our findings help alleviate concerns that the
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expansion of international activity following reform is concentrated within the boundaries of MNFs,
which may imply limited technological spillovers to the domestic economy.
Finally, we use the magnitude of our primary results to explore the implied effective size of the
PTA-induced IPR reform in our sample of developing countries. To accomplish this, we compare
our baseline regression results to estimates from regressions that consider changes to the commonly-
used country-level IPR protection index of Ginarte and Park as an indicator of IPR reform (Park,
2008). We show that the estimated impact of IP-related PTA reform on offshoring in High-IP
industries is equivalent to the impact of about a one-unit increase in the IPR index. Given that the
IPR index ranges from 0 to 5 with a standard deviation of 0.68 in our sample, this suggests that
the IPR requirements included in PTAs may indeed be equivalent to major IPR reform in terms of
its effect on US offshoring behavior.
2 Background and Main Concepts
2.1 PTAs and IPR reform
In principle, the primary function of PTAs is to allow countries to negotiate reductions in
tariffs and other trade barriers in goods and services without extending the same reductions to
non-signatories of the PTA. Although this goal is in direct conflict with the WTO’s foundational
most-favored nation requirement, PTAs are permissible under WTO rules provided they satisfy
two key requirements. First, a PTA must not raise the overall level of trade protection against
other WTO members. Second, it must liberalize “substantially all trade” among PTA members.3
This latter requirement has an important implication for the present paper as it suggests that
any effect on intermediate goods trade specifically from the tariff effect of signing a PTA should
be common to High-IP and Low-IP industries. Although most PTAs do exempt some product
categories from liberalization in practice, these exemptions comprise only about 7% of tariff lines
and affect a relatively small proportion of overall trade (WTO, 2011).
Of course, PTAs frequently go beyond trade liberalization and incorporate so called “deep” inte-
gration in the regulation of other areas including health and safety, labor, environmental standards,
and IPRs. Critically, IPR protections implemented as part of a PTAs must also be extended to
WTO member countries outside of the PTA under WTO rules. The TRIPS Agreement mandates
that all IPR regulations be subject to most-favored nation and national treatment principles. In the
context of the current study, this implies that the IP protection standards faced by US based MNFs
are affected by PTA-induced IPR reform, even if the US is not directly party to the agreement.
To help illustrate the importance of PTAs to the global trade system, Figure 1 displays the
number of PTAs signed worldwide from 1960-2010 using data from Kohl et al. (2016). Note both
the sharp increase in the prevalence of PTAs beginning in the early 1990’s, and the increase in
the proportion of these PTAs that include specific IPR provisions following the implementation of
TRIPS in 1995. However, Kohl et al. (2016) does not provide information on the relative strength
3See Article XXIV GATT for details regarding the WTO’s official treatment of PTAs.
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of IPR standards included in these agreements. To be sure, not all of these “IP-related” agreements
contain comparable TRIPS-plus requirements. Approximately two-thirds of all PTAs are among
developing countries (so called “South-South” agreements) (WTO, 2011). Even if these agreements
include language related to IPRs, the associated requirements are often considerably less stringent
than the regulatory standards favored by developed countries.
Figure 1: Signed PTAs (1960-2010)
Source: Authors’ construction using data from Kohl et al. (2016).
We address this issue by focusing our analysis on a subset of PTAs that are most likely to
require substantial IPR reform. For this purpose, we restrict attention to IP-related agreements that
include a developing country and either the US, EU, or EFTA as a signatory. These three trading
blocks have consistently required core aspects of TRIPS-plus standards to be included in their
agreements with developing countries (Maskus and Ridley, 2016). Examples of these requirements
include test data confidentiality for pharmaceuticals and chemicals, patent protection for life forms,
copyright protection for electronic content and digital goods, and extending the duration of patent
and copyright protection. Moreover, these agreements eliminate much of the enforcement flexibility
afforded to developing countries under TRIPS and often include requirements for criminal and civil
penalties for infringement (Sell, 2010; Campi and Dueñas, 2019). Of course, even within this subset
of PTAs, there is some variation in specific standards and the emphasis placed on different forms
of IPRs. On the whole however, the IPR requirements included in this subset of PTAs are “clearly
drivers of significant reform in developing countries” (Biadgleng and Maur, 2011).
Table 1 lists the IP-related PTAs included in the sample, their associated signatories, and the
year each agreement enters into force. To construct our sample, we first considered all PTAs in the
Kohl et al. (2016) dataset that incorporate specific IPR provisions and enter into force during our
post-TRIPS estimation period of 2002-2012. Then, we identified all PTAs between a non-OECD
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country and either the US, EU, or EFTA.4 Following Maskus and Ridley (2016) and Campi and
Dueñas (2019), we add accession into the EU itself during the sample period as an IP-related PTA
since the accession agreement includes strict IPR requirements. The resulting sample includes 25
countries that enter at least one IP-related PTA with either the US, EU, or EFTA during the
post-TRIPS sample period of 2002-2012.
Table 1: IP-Related PTAs in Sample (2002-2012)
Agreement Year
Jordan - EFTA, EU 2002
Singapore - EFTA, US 2003
EU Accession(1) Varies
Morocco - US 2004
Tunisia - EFTA 2005
CAFTA-US(2) 2006
Egypt - EFTA 2007
CARIFORUM-EU(3) 2008
SACU - EFTA(4) 2008
Cote d’Ivoire - EU 2009
Peru - US 2009
Cameroon - EU 2009
Colombia - EFTA 2011
(1) Sample countries: Cyprus (2004), Lithuania (2004), Malta (2004), Bulgaria (2007)
(2) Sample countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic
(2007), Costa Rica (2009)
(3) Sample countries: Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago
(4) Sample countries: Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland
2.2 Measuring Industry Intellectual Property Intensity
A fundamental challenge to assessing the impact of IPRs in developing countries is that changes
to IPR systems are typically implemented as a part of a broader set of reforms. For example, the
IPR requirements of TRIPS were only one component of the sweeping changes to the regulatory
framework governing international trade from the creation of the WTO. Consequently, it is difficult
to isolate the effects of IPR reform specifically from the confounding effects of concurrent policy
changes. As mentioned in the previous section, this issue is relevant in the present paper as PTAs
signed with developing countries routinely include not only tariff changes but also standards in
labor, health, and environmental regulation.
Following a line of literature including Branstetter et al. (2006, 2011), Delgado et al. (2013),
4We reiterate that this restriction helps to ensure that the PTAs included in our sample require substantial IPR
reform. In addition, our approach follows a line of empirical literature examining the impact of IPR reform in
developing countries specifically, including Ivus et al. (2017) and Ivus and Park (2019) among others. Our focus on
non-OECD reforming countries aligns with Sell (2010), who details the clear distinction between IPR institutions
among countries within and outside of the OECD in the context of TRIPS-plus standards.
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Canals and Şener (2014), and Ivus and Park (2019), we identify the effect of IPR reform on US
offshoring by exploiting industry level variation in the importance of intellectual property to firms
within the industry. That is, we estimate the differential effect of implementing an IP-related PTA
within industries that are relatively IP intensive against a control group of industries with relatively
low IP intensity. As long as other regulatory changes do not vary systematically across these two
groups, this differential effect can be attributed to IPR reforms.
As our primary measure of industry intellectual property intensity, we use information from
the“Research and Development Funding Expenditures” survey conducted by the National Science
Foundation.5 In particular, we use one of the questions in the Intellectual Property and Technology
Transfer (section 6) regarding the importance of six types of intellectual property protection.6
When asked about the importance of protection, companies can choose between three answers:
“very important,” “somewhat important” and “not important.” We compute the percentage of
firms within each industry that consider patent protection either “somewhat important” or “very
important,” and classify the industries according to these percentage (see results in Table 2).
Table 2: Industry IP Intensity
Industry Patents imp. %





Petroleum and coal products⋆ 19.38
Transportation equipment⋆ 18.55




Apparel and accessories 10.43
Primary metals 10.03
Fabricated metal products 8.68
Nonmetallic mineral products 8.55
Food and kindred products 6.73
Furniture and related products 5.05
Printing and related activities 3.65
Wood products 3.45
Percentages denote the share of surveyed firms that indicate
patent protection is “somewhat important” or “very important,”
averaged for the years 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. The ⋆ denotes
classification as High-IP intensity in the primary specification.
5See https://nsf.gov/statistics/questionnaires.cfm#ResearchandDevelopmentFundingandExpenditures,
under “Business R&D and Innovation Survey.”
6The six types of intellectual property protection are: utility patents, design patents, trademarks, copyrights,
trade secrets, and mask works (that is copyright protection for semiconductor products).
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Using these percentages, we sort industries into two groups: a High-IP intensity treatment
group and a Low-IP intensity control group. In our primary specification, we include all industries
with reported patent importance above the overall average of 15.3% in the High-IP group. As
indicated in Table 2, this results in 8 of the 19 total industries classified as High-IP. Average patent
importance among High-IP industries is 25.25%, while the average among Low-IP industries is
8.08%. In Section 4.1, we explore alternative classification approaches and demonstrate that our
main empirical results continue to hold.
2.3 Offshoring Intensity
We compute a measure of foreign outsourcing for each industry, country, year triplet based on
trade in intermediate goods following Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) and Canals and Şener
(2014). Specifically, we define offshoring intensity as the value of intermediate goods that a US
industry imports from a particular country to produce one dollar worth of output. We focus
on intra-industry or “core” offshoring, which corresponds to Feenstra and Hanson’s definition of
narrow offshoring. As widely recognized in the literature since the influential work of Feenstra and
Hanson, restricting attention to imports of intermediate goods within the same industry better
captures production activities that could have been performed in the US but are outsourced to a
foreign country, mainly for cost savings motives7 Finally, we decompose this total core offshoring
measure into “related party” and “non-related party” components based on whether production
occurred within or outside the boundaries of the firm.
Ultimately, for each year and industry-country pair, we have three main measures of offshoring:
1. Offshoring intensity between related parties: value of intermediate goods that a US
industry imports from a particular country within the boundaries of the firm and within the
same industry to produce one dollar worth of output.




2. Offshoring intensity between non-related parties: value of intermediate goods that a
US industry imports from a particular country outside the boundaries of the firm and within
the same industry to produce one dollar worth of output.




3. Total offshoring intensity: value of intermediate goods that a US industry imports from
a particular country, either within or outside the boundaries of the firm, and within the same
7See Egger and Egger (2006), Geishecker and Görg (2008), and Hijzen and Swaim (2010) among others.
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industry to produce one dollar worth of output.






where aiit denotes the dollar value of inputs that industry i gets from this same industry to produce
one dollar worth of i output at time t, and Cit denotes total consumption of industry i in the US
economy at time t. We obtain these data from the US input-output (IO) tables provided by
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). MRict and M
NR
ict denote the total volume of imports
of industry i from country c at time t from related and non-related parties respectively. Data on
bilateral related and non-related party imports are obtained from related party trade data collected
by the US Census Bureau from US customs declarations.8
Following Canals and Şener (2014), we extend the import proportionality assumption proposed
by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999). In this particular case, we assume that industry i uses inputs
of this same industry i from country c in the same proportion as the economy-wide use of that
particular input (both within and outside the boundaries of the firm, respectively). This extension
has recently been adopted by the OECD in their Trade in Value Added (TiVA) calculations.9 For
example, suppose the computer manufacturing industry uses $0.15 worth of computer parts as an
input to produce $1 worth of output (aiit = 0.15), and 20% of all computer parts consumed in the
US comes from related party sources within Singapore (MRcit/Cit = 0.2), then we estimate that to
produce $1 worth of US computers, 3 cents worth of Singapore computer parts from a related party
relationship are used (0.15 · 0.2 = 0.03). Thus, offshoring intensity measures are reported in cents
per dollar of output produced.
2.4 Offshoring and IP-related PTAs
As a first look at trends in offshoring, Figure 2 plots the average offshoring intensity of sample
countries before and after an IP-related PTA took effect. All averages are reported in cents per
dollar of output. Panel (a) illustrates that average total offshoring across all industries increased
by 35.3% following an IP-related PTA. Panel (b) decomposes total offshoring into high and low IP
intensity industry groups. Prior to a PTA, offshoring is clearly concentrated in Low-IP industries.
Following a PTA however, we see a clear shift in the intensity of offshoring towards High-IP indus-
tries relative to Low-IP industries. Average offshoring in High-IP industries increases by 150% in
the post-PTA period, while offshoring in low-IP industries decreases slightly by 3.3%.
Figure 3 further decomposes average offshoring into related and non-related party subgroups.
We focus first on Low-IP industries. Panel (c) shows that the bulk (∼ 75%) of offshoring in these
industries is conducted outside the boundaries of the firm. From panel (a) and (b), we see that both
types of offshoring decrease modestly following a PTA, and non-related party offshoring continues
8See Ruhl (2013) for details on the related party trade data by the US Census.
9For details, see OECD (2012) and http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/TiVA_Guide_to_Country_Notes.pdf. See
Appendix A.1 for our approach to industry aggregation in the construction of offshoring measures.
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Figure 2: Total Offshoring
(a) All Industries (b) IP Intensity
Figure 2 reports total offshoring combined among all industries included in the associated industry category and
averaged across country-year observations in the before and after PTA periods. Averages are reported in cents per
dollar of output.
to account for the majority of offshoring in Low-IP industries in the post PTA period. In High-IP
industries however, panel (c) shows that non-related party offshoring accounts for just 40.3% of
average total offshoring prior to a PTA. Furthermore, while both types of offshoring in in High-IP
industries increase substantially following a PTA, the increase is clearly concentrated in related
party offshoring. As displayed in panel (a) and (b), average related party offshoring increases
200%, while non-related party offshoring increases 75.5%. Consequently, the share of average total
offshoring in High-IP industries conducted outside the boundaries of the firm decreases a full 12%,
accounting for just 28.3% of the total in the post PTA period, as shown in panel (c).
Finally, since our empirical strategy isolates the impact of the IPR reforms included in PTAs
by estimating the differential effect of the PTA in Low-IP and High-IP industry groups, it is
important to verify that these groups exhibit similar pre-event trends. We investigate this these
pre-event trends more formally using an event study framework in Section 4.2. As a first look
however, Figure 4 plots average total offshoring intensity among sample countries across years
relative to each country’s PTA reform together with linear trend lines in the pre and post-PTA
periods. Given the substantial heterogeneity in the scale of offshoring among sample countries,
each county’s offshoring intensity in Low-IP and High-IP categories is normalized to one in the
year its PTA enters into force. This normalization mirrors our actual estimation methodology that
includes country, industry pair fixed effects and ensures that sample countries are weighted equally
in the calculated average.10
In the years leading up to a PTA, the High-IP and Low-IP industry groups exhibit similar rates
10This normalization does imply that Figure 4 illustrates relative trends only; it does not reflect differences in
offshoring levels between Low-IP and High-IP industries. For reference, average offshoring in the year of PTA reform
(year zero) is 43.6% higher in Low-IP industries.
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Figure 3: Composition of Offshoring
(a) Related Party (b) Non-related Party
(c) Composition: Share of Non-related Party
Figure 3 reports related party offshoring, non-related party offshoring, and the share of total offshoring conducted
through non-related parties. As in Figure 2, offshoring is combined among all industries included in the associated
industry category and averaged across country-year observations in the before and after PTA periods. Averages in
panel (a) and (b) are reported in cents per dollar of output.
of increase in total offshoring intensity to their respective reform date average. As shown in panel
(b), the ratio of average offshoring in High-IP industries to Low-IP industries is essentially flat in
the pre-PTA period. However, in the years following an IP-related PTA, average total offshoring
in High-IP industries continues to exhibit substantial growth while offshoring in Low-IP stagnates.
This corresponds to a clear increase in the growth rate of offshoring in High-IP industries relative
to their Low-IP counterparts in the post-PTA period. Note that our measure of offshoring intensity
ensures that this relative growth in offshoring in High-IP industries is not driven by increased US
consumption in these industries in the post-PTA period. This is because any change to the overall
volume of offshoring in a particular industry due to corresponding changes in the volume of US
consumption in that industry will not affect the associated value of offshoring per dollar of output
11
that we capture.11
Figure 4: Trends in Total Offshoring
(a) Average Total Offshoring (b) Ratio of High-IP to Low-IP
Figure 4 panel (a) plots normalized total offshoring intensity combined among all industries in Low-IP and High-IP
categories and averaged across countries in each year relative to the year of PTA reform. Each country’s total
offshoring intensity in Low-IP and High-IP categories is normalized to its value in the year of PTA reform. Panel
(b) plots the ratio of average normalized total offshoring in High-IP industries to Low-IP industries.
3 Estimation Methodology
To assess the impact of PTA-induced IPR reform on US offshoring, we utilize a difference-in-
difference approach following Branstetter et al. (2006, 2011), Delgado et al. (2013), and Canals and
Şener (2014). Our primary specification at the industry-country level is
Okict = αic + αt + βct+ β1Hct + β2PTAct + β3PTAct ·High-IPi + ǫict, (3.1)
where i indexes industry, c indexes country, and t indexes year (2002-2012). As discussed in the
previous section, the dependent variable Okict represents the value of US offshoring of category k in
industry i from country c per dollar of output in year t. We separately examine three categories
of US offshoring intensity: related party (R), non-related party (NR), and the combined total (T).
The key variables of interest are the post reform dummy variable PTAct and the interaction term
PTAct ·High-IPi that estimates the differential effect of the reform in IP-intensive industries. PTAct
takes a value of one beginning in the year that the country’s first IP related PTA enters into force
11Since our sample includes the 2007-2009 recession, the lack of growth in offshoring intensity in Low-IP industries
in the post-PTA period should be viewed in the context of the sustained decline in overall US trade relative to GDP
following the recession. Although the years affected by the recession differ relative to reform year among sample
countries, they will still be concentrated in the post-PTA period. We account for the impact of the recession in
our empirical specification both by estimating the treatment effect of an IP-related PTA as the differential effect on
offshoring in High-IP and Low-IP industry groups and by including year fixed effects.
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and thereafter (see Table 1). High-IPi takes a value of one if the industry is classified as IP intensive
(Table 2).
As controls, we include country-industry pair fixed effects, year fixed effects, country-specific
time trends, and several time varying country characteristics Hct. Following Canals and Şener
(2014), Hct includes GDP, GDP per capita, the real exchange rate with the US dollar, and a
measure of trade openness defined as total international trade over GDP. In addition, we include
the Fraser Institute’s index of the strength of each country’s legal system. As emphasized by Hu
and Png (2013), this helps to control for potential differences in sample countries’ ability to enforce
legal rights, possibly including IPRs. Finally, as a check against the primary empirical results, we
estimate a version of equation (3.1) that includes both country-industry and country-year pair fixed
effects. That is, we estimate
Okict = αic + αct + β3PTAct ·High-IPi + ǫict. (3.2)
As argued in Bilir (2014) and Maskus and Yang (2018), country-year pair fixed effects help alleviate
endogeneity concerns associated with the effect of any omitted policy changes that are implemented
concurrently with the IPR reforms required by a PTA. This is because including country-year fixed
effects ensures that identification of the coefficient of interest, β3, is driven by industry level variation
in the effect of a PTA across Low and High-IP industries within each country-year observation.
Of course, the potential endogeneity of PTA related IPR reform remains an important concern.
Specifically, it may be that developing countries select into an IP-related PTA because of factors re-
lated to their existing relationship with US offshoring in IP intensive industries. If this is indeed the
case, the treatment of IPR reform is nonrandom with respect to the outcome of interest. However,
as argued in Maskus and Ridley (2016), Maskus and Yang (2018) and Campi and Dueñas (2019),
this concern is partially alleviated because the IPR requirements of a PTA are often considered a
second-order negotiating concession from developing countries, rather than a primary motivating
factor for signing an PTA. In other words, at least to a certain extent, PTA-induced IPR reform
in developing countries can be reasonably viewed as an exogenous policy change.
However, since endogeneity can not be ruled out completely, we also include estimates from
a sample that excludes all countries that sign PTAs with the US at any time during the sample
period. All remaining countries sign PTAs only with either EU, the EFTA, or both. Within this
restricted sample of only non-US PTAs, we argue that it is unlikely that a country’s selection into
a PTA is driven by its relationship with US offshoring.12 Since IPR policy must be applied to all
WTO members under TRIPS requirements, the reform still impacts the IPR policy faced by US
firms. Moreover, since the US is not party to a PTA with any country included in the restricted
sample, there is no direct tariff effect for US MNFs.
12This approach is similar to Ridley (2018), which examines the impact of IP-related PTAs on bilateral trade flows
among countries that are not directly party to the agreement.
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3.1 Data Set
We combine several data sources to construct our final data set that covers offshoring activities
of 19 US industries (see Table 2) to 25 developing economies over the period 2002-2012 (see Table 1).
Each of those countries has implemented at least one PTA with IPR requirements with the US, the
EU or EFTA. As detailed in Section 2.3, we combine US IO tables from the BEA with US bilateral
imports that distinguish between related and non-related party from the US Census Bureau to
construct our measures offshoring intensity. Data on IP-related PTAs is from Kohl et al. (2016)
and Maskus and Ridley (2016). The High-IP industry classification is based on the “Research and
Development Funding Expenditures” survey conducted by the National Science Foundation. GDP,
GDP per capita, and trade openness are obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI
2009), while RER is constructed by using nominal exchange rates from Penn World Tables 6.3 and
inflation rates from WDI (2009) for most countries. Finally, we utilize the Fraser Institute’s index
of the strength of legal systems and property rights.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
All PTAs (25 countries) Exclude US PTAs (15 countries)
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Total offshoring (cents per US$) 0.091 0.129 4.38E-04 0.505 0.060 0.113 4.38E-04 0.418
Non-related party offshoring 0.053 0.074 3.98E-04 0.306 0.044 0.083 3.98E-04 0.306
Related party offshoring 0.038 0.079 4.04E-05 0.385 0.016 0.031 4.04E-05 0.112
GDP per capita (US$) 6795 8438 1023 37038 6960 6856 1023 24876
GDP (billons US$) 54.95 71.84 1.628 272.9 56.88 83.57 1.628 272.9
Trade openness (X +M)/GDP 106.7 71.39 36.23 391.9 101.7 46.00 36.22 198.3
Real exchange rate 147.1 409.8 0.392 1969 217.8 517.4 0.392 1969
Legal system index 5.049 1.344 2.538 8.394 5.078 1.367 2.538 7.368
Summary statistics are computed from country level averages across the 2002-2012 sample period. As in Section 2.3, offshoring
intensities are combined across all industries to obtain overall offshoring within a sample country and reported in cents per US
dollar of output. Legal system index refers to the Fraser Institute’s index of the strength of legal systems and property rights.
The index ranges from zero to ten.
Country level descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 3. Note that countries included in the
estimation sample exhibit substantial heterogeneity across economic size, development, and open-
ness to trade. For example, average GDP ranges from a minimum of 1.628 billion US dollars in
Guyana to a maximum of 272.9 billion in South Africa. The sample includes a number of extremely
poor countries such as Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, and Nicaragua, and substantially wealthier coun-
tries such as Cyprus and Singapore. The minimum average GDP per capita in the sample is $1,023
in Cameroon and the maximum is $37,038 in Singapore. Similarly, sample countries display large
differences in openness to international trade. Average trade openness ranges from 36.23% of GDP
in Colombia to a whopping 391.9% in Singapore.
Note that overall country averages in GDP, GDP per capita, and trade openness are quite
similar among the two estimation samples. On the other hand, the restricted sample excluding US
PTAs exhibits substantially smaller mean offshoring intensity. This difference is most pronounced
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in related party offshoring, where the restricted sample mean is just 42% of the overall sample
average. This implies that sample countries that enter into an IP-related PTA with the United
States tend to have a stronger offshoring relationship with the US compared to countries that
sign PTAs with the EU or EFTA. While only suggestive, this is consistent with the possibility that
countries may select into US PTAs because of their relationship with US offshoring, and underscores
the importance of including estimation results using the restricted sample.
4 Results
We now present our empirical estimates of equations (3.1) and (3.2) for the time period 2002-
2012 using both the sample including all IP-related PTAs and the restricted sample excluding PTAs
signed with the US. We begin by separately examining the relationship between IP-related PTAs
and each of the three categories of US offshoring: total, non-related party, and related party. In
each case, we take the log of the associated offshoring dependent variable so that estimated reform
coefficients carry a semi-elasticity interpretation. In all regressions, we report robust standard
errors clustered at the country level to allow for correlation in the error term among industries and
across time within the same country.
Table 4 reports our results with the log of total offshoring intensity as the dependent variable.
First note that the estimates in column (1) imply that IP-related PTA reforms are associated with
a statistically insignificant 4.1% increase in total offshoring (e0.04 − 1) when we do not distinguish
between High and Low-IP industries. This suggests that the overall increase in US offshoring
across all industries following a PTA is not statistically different from the value predicted by the
other control variables, including country-specific time trends. On the other hand, the positive
and statistically significant coefficient on the PTA, High-IP interaction term in column (2) implies
that an IP-related PTA is associated with a substantial increase in offshoring within IP intensive
industries, relative to the Low-IP control group. More specifically, the estimated coefficients imply
that total offshoring in High-IP industries increases by 43.5% (e0.361−1) relative to the statistically
insignificant 11.3% decrease (e−0.120 − 1) in Low-IP industries. To examine the absolute, rather
than relative, effect of the reform in High-IP industries, we test the null hypothesis that the sum
of estimated coefficients on the reform dummy and the reform, High-IP interaction term is equal
to zero (β2+β3 = 0 in equation (3.1)). As reported in column (2), we reject this null hypothesis at
the 5% level, suggesting that PTAs are associated with a 27.5% (e(0.361−.120)− 1) absolute increase
in total offshoring in High-IP industries, in addition to its relative effect. Finally in column (3),
we include country-year pair FE, which absorb all country level variation in the sample to ensure
identification is driven by differences in the impact of PTAs at the industry level. The interaction
term coefficient remains positive, statistically significant, and translates to a 45.2% (e0.373 − 1)
differential increase High-IP industries, consistent with the results in column (2).13
13Henceforth, we omit the calculations that convert coefficient estimates to their implied semi-elasticity interpre-
tation.
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Table 4: Total Offshoring
All PTAs Exclude US PTAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log GDP per capita -7.277 -7.331 – -24.27*** -24.52*** –
(4.773) (4.810) (7.558) (7.587)
Log GDP 7.731 7.786 – 24.88*** 25.13*** –
(4.822) (4.859) (7.632) (7.661)
Log Real Exchange 0.666 0.660 – 0.495 0.483 –
(0.549) (0.551) (0.549) (0.549)
Log Trade Openness 0.151 0.152 – 0.133 0.142 –
(0.292) (0.293) (0.330) (0.331)
Legal System Index -0.034 -0.034 – 0.025 0.024 –
(0.066) (0.066) (0.073) (0.073)
PTA dummy 0.040 -0.120 – -0.029 -0.178 –
(0.100) (0.100) (0.115) (0.105)
PTA x High-IP – 0.361*** 0.373*** – 0.333** 0.352***
(0.074) (0.072) (0.104) (0.101)
P-Values for H0:
PTA + PTAxHigh = 0 – 0.039 – – 0.304 –
Country-ind. pair FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year pair FE N N Y N N Y
Country time trends Y Y – Y Y –
Year FE Y Y – Y Y –
Countries 25 25 25 15 15 15
Observations 4,465 4,465 4,465 2,499 2,499 2,499
R-squared 0.917 0.918 0.922 0.904 0.904 0.909
PTA dummy is equal to one in the year that an IP-related PTA enters into force and thereafter.
See Table 1 for the timing of PTAs and Table 2 for the list of High-IP industries. Robust standard
errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. P-values for PTA + PTAxHigh-IP = 0 are
computed using the delta method. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
In columns (4)-(6), we repeat the same regressions using the restricted sample that excludes
all sample countries that sign a PTA with the US during the sample period. First, note that the
estimated coefficients on the interaction term in columns (5) and (6) imply a relative increase in
total US offshoring in High-IP industries of 39.5% and 42.2% respectively. On the other hand, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of β2 + β3 = 0 in column (5), and thus do not find evidence of an
absolute increase in US offshoring in High-IP industries in the restricted sample. These findings
suggest the IPR reform induced by a PTA are associated with a similar relative increase in US
offshoring in High-IP industries even when the US is not party to the agreement. However, other
aspects of the PTAs that are specific to signatories, namely tariff reductions, may partially drive
increases in the overall scale of US offshoring. Indeed, note from column (4) that the negative
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coefficient estimate on the PTA dummy implies a 2.9% decrease in total offshoring following a non-
US PTA. Although this finding is not statistically significant, this estimated decrease compared
to the corresponding estimate of a 4.1% increase when using the entire sample in column (1) is
consistent with a positive absolute effect on US offshoring when all regulatory changes in the PTA
apply to the US.
Table 5: Related Party Offshoring
All PTAs Exclude US PTAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PTA dummy 0.018 -0.132 – -0.002 -0.360 –
(0.103) (0.142) (0.139) (0.214)
PTA x High-IP – 0.308 0.309 – 0.680** 0.684***
(0.193) (0.184) (0.245) (0.227)
P-Values for H0:
PTA + PTAxHigh = 0 – 0.201 – – 0.044 –
Country-ind. pair FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year pair FE N N Y N N Y
Country controls Y Y – Y Y –
Country time trends Y Y – Y Y –
Year FE Y Y – Y Y –
Countries 25 25 25 15 15 15
Observations 3,683 3,683 3,681 1,897 1,897 1,895
R-squared 0.862 0.862 0.869 0.847 0.849 0.857
PTA dummy is equal to one in the year that an IP-related PTA enters into force and
thereafter. Country controls refer to log GDP per capita, log GDP, log real exchange
rate, log trade openness, and legal system index. Robust standard errors clustered at the
country level in parentheses. P-values for PTA + PTAxHigh-IP = 0 are computed using
the delta method. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
Next, we repeat the same regression exercise with the log of related party offshoring as the
dependent variable. We report results in Table 5 and omit estimates of control variable coefficients
for brevity. Although, we do not find significant evidence that IP-related PTAs increase related
party offshoring (either absolute or relative to Low-IP industries) when the entire sample is con-
sidered, we think that this result should be interpreted cautiously. The interaction term coefficient
point estimates do indicate a substantial relative increase in High-IP related party offshoring and
their associated p-values of 0.118 and 0.106 are close to marginal levels of statistical significance.
In addition, we show in Section 4.1 that we do find significant evidence of a positive increase when
we consider a narrower set of IP-intensive industries. Finally, when PTAs signed with the US are
excluded, the coefficient estimates of column (5) translate to a 97.4% relative increase in related
party offshoring. We find statistically significant evidence of a 37.7% absolute increase in related
party offshoring in the restricted sample. The estimated relative increase is essentially unchanged
when we include country-year pair fixed effects in column (6). When interpreting the magnitude
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of these results, keep in mind that countries included in the restricted sample tend to have low
levels of related party offshoring in the pre-reform period. While these estimates suggest impressive
increases in related party offshoring compared to this baseline, they imply a more modest absolute
increase in offshoring in terms of cents per dollar of output.
Table 6: Non-Related Party Offshoring
All PTAs Exclude US PTAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PTA dummy 0.056 -0.089 – 0.011 -0.114 –
(0.105) (0.108) (0.098) (0.108)
PTA x High-IP – 0.324*** 0.330*** – 0.297** 0.303**
(0.075) (0.074) (0.120) (0.119)
P-Values for H0:
PTA + PTAxHigh = 0 – 0.042 – – 0.164 –
Country-ind. pair FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year pair FE N N Y N N Y
Country controls Y Y – Y Y –
Country time trends Y Y – Y Y –
Year FE Y Y – Y Y –
Countries 25 25 25 15 15 15
Observations 4,429 4,429 4,429 2,471 2,471 2,471
R-squared 0.904 0.904 0.909 0.896 0.897 0.902
PTA dummy is equal to one in the year that an IP-related PTA enters into force and there-
after. Country controls refer to log GDP per capita, log GDP, log real exchange rate, log
trade openness, and legal system index. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level
in parentheses. P-values for PTA + PTAxHigh-IP = 0 are computed using the delta method.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
We report empirical results with the log of non-related party offshoring as the dependent variable
in Table 6. The corresponding empirical estimates largely mirror our total offshoring findings. In
both samples, the estimates in columns (1) and (4) suggest no significant increase in non-related
party offshoring without distinguishing between High-IP and Low-IP industries. The estimates in
columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) all suggest a substantial positive differential effect of reform in High-
IP industries. When the whole sample is considered in column (2), we find that an IP-related PTA
is associated with a 38.3% relative increase in non-related party offshoring. Using the restricted
sample, estimates reported in column (5) suggest a comparable relative increase of 34.6%. In both
cases, the corresponding estimates when we include country-year fixed effects in columns (3) and
(6) imply very similar relative increases. Once again, we find evidence of an absolute increase in
non-related party offshoring when we include US PTAs, but not in the restricted sample.
Finally, we repeat our regression estimation using the percentage of total offshoring that is
conducted through non-related parties as the dependent variable, %NR = ONRict /O
T
ict x 100. This
allows us to examine if IP-related PTAs are associated with significant changes to the composition
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of US offshoring. As reported in Table 7, we do not find evidence for a compositional effect in either
sample. Although the sign of the estimated interaction term coefficient suggests a relative movement
towards related party offshoring in High-IP industries (about 2.7% and 4.0% of total offshoring
using the entire and restricted sample respectively), this effect is not statistically significant in any
of our regression specifications. The direction of our results do mirror our preliminary findings
using unconditional sample averages in Section 2.3. As illustrated in Figure 3, the unconditional
average share of offshoring in High-IP industries conducted through non-related parties using the
entire sample decreased by 12% in the post reform period. Although not statistically significant,
the corresponding point estimate in column (2) suggests a PTA can account for a 2.77% decrease
(about 23% of the observed change in unconditional averages).
Table 7: Composition of Offshoring: Percentage Non-Related (%NR)
All PTAs Exclude US PTAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PTA dummy -1.090 0.137 – -0.917 0.910 –
(1.378) (1.433) (1.698) (1.905)
PTA x High-IP – -2.766 -2.693 – -4.066 -3.966
(2.158) (2.137) (2.535) (2.506)
P-Values for H0:
PTA + PTAxHigh = 0 – 0.204 – – 0.178 –
Country-ind. pair FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year pair FE N N Y N N Y
Country controls Y Y – Y Y –
Country time trends Y Y – Y Y –
Year FE Y Y – Y Y –
Countries 25 25 25 15 15 15
Observations 4,465 4,465 4,465 2,499 2,499 2,499
R-squared 0.631 0.631 0.646 0.556 0.557 0.571
PTA dummy is equal to one in the year that an IP-related PTA enters into force and
thereafter. Country controls refer to log GDP per capita, log GDP, log real exchange
rate, log trade openness, and legal system index. Robust standard errors clustered at
the country level in parentheses. P-values for PTA + PTAxHigh-IP = 0 are computed
using the delta method. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
4.1 Alternate Specifications
In this section, we examine the robustness of our findings to alternate regression specifications.
First, we examine the sensitivity of our primary results to an alternate classification of Low-IP and
High-IP industries based on the standard classification used in existing literature, rather than NSF
survey responses. As mentioned in Section 2.2, a substantial empirical literature has identified the
impact of IPR reforms by estimating the differential effect in IP intensive industries relative to non-
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intensive industries. Although there is some variation in the approach to these classifications in the
literature, there is also broad agreement that a certain set of industries qualify as IP intensive.14
Following this precedent, we consider an alternate High-IP group of 5 industries: computer and
electronic products, chemicals, electrical equipment, machinery, and transportation equipment. All
other industries are included in the Low-IP group. Note that all of the industries comprising this
alternate High-IP group are included in our primary High-IP classification. However, the alternate
High-IP group is narrower; excluding petroleum and coal products, plastics and rubber products,
and miscellaneous manufacturing.
Table 8: Alternate High-IP Intensity Classification
All PTAs Exclude US PTAs
Total Related Non-Related % NR Total Related Non-Related %NR
PTA -0.055 -0.119 -0.019 -0.027 -0.113 -0.183 -0.076 0.133
(0.094) (0.130) (0.104) (1.538) (0.095) (0.189) (0.087) (1.733)
PTA x Alt. High-IP 0.335*** 0.431*** 0.262** -3.751* 0.292* 0.528** 0.297* -3.634*
(0.096) (0.152) (0.113) (1.943) (0.150) (0.233) (0.152) (2.063)
P-Values for H0:
PTA + PTAxHigh = 0 0.048 0.007 0.088 0.042 0.370 0.028 0.210 0.137
Observations 4,465 3,683 4,429 4,465 2,499 1,897 2,471 2,499
R-squared 0.917 0.862 0.904 0.631 0.904 0.848 0.897 0.556
Industries considered High-IP in the alternate classification are: computer and electronic products, chemicals, electrical equipment,
machinery, and transportation equipment. All regressions include control variables: log GDP per capita, log GDP, log real exchange
rate, log trade openness, legal system index, country-industry pair FE, year FE, and country time trends. Robust standard errors
clustered at the country level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
In Table 8, we report results for each of the three offshoring categories and the percentage of
offshoring conducted through non-related parties for both estimation samples using the alternate
High-IP classification. In all cases, these regressions include country-industry pair fixed effects,
country-specific time trends, year fixed effects, and the same country level control variables as the
previous section. Thus, they correspond directly to the estimates of equation (3.1) reported in
columns (2) and (5) in the tables of the previous section. We omit the estimation results of the
control variables for brevity.15 We find strong evidence for relative and absolute increases in each
type of offshoring when the entire sample is included. Unlike our primary results, this includes
related party offshoring; the estimated coefficients in Table 8 imply a substantial 53.9% relative
and 36.6% absolute increase in related party offshoring among these industries following a PTA.
This supports the hypothesis that some US enterprises do increase offshoring within the boundaries
of the firm following implementation of a PTA with the US, but that positive effect is confined to a
narrower set of industries. When the restricted sample is considered, our empirical estimates echo
our primary findings. We find evidence that all types of offshoring experience a relative increase
14Analyses using this empirical methodology include Javorcik (2004), Branstetter et al. (2011), Delgado et al.
(2013), Hu and Png (2013), and Canals and Şener (2014). Common approaches to proxying industry IP intensity
include measuring patents awarded or R&D expenditure relative to industry sales.
15We also examined specifications with country-year pair fixed effects and found results to be similar.
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in the industries included in the alternate High-IP classification, and find some evidence for a
compositional shift towards related party offshoring. However, we only find evidence that these
industries experience an absolute increase in related party offshoring.
Next, we depart from the binary Low and High-IP industry categorization and examine how the
effect of IP-related PTAs differs across industries based on the relative importance of IPRs to firms
within the industry. As before, we rely on NSF survey results of the percentage of firms within
each industry that report patents to be “somewhat important” or “very important” to proxy the
importance of IPRs. We estimate an alternate version of equation (3.1) where the High-IP dummy
variable measure is replaced by this continuous, industry specific proxy (Pat. imp. %).16 Results
are reported in Table 9.
Table 9: Continuous Patent Importance
All PTAs Exclude US PTAs
Total Related Non-Related % NR Total Related Non-Related %NR
PTA -0.135 -0.164 -0.064 1.297 -0.208** -0.369 -0.146 1.447
(0.096) (0.189) (0.105) (1.880) (0.095) (0.283) (0.102) (1.959)
PTA x Pat. imp. % 0.011*** 0.011 0.008** -0.153* 0.011* 0.021* 0.010* -0.150*
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.082) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.074)
Abs. Effect Threshold 12.27% 14.91% 8.00% 8.48% 18.91% 17.57% 14.60% 9.65%
Observations 4,465 3,683 4,429 4,465 2,499 1,897 2,471 2,499
R-squared 0.917 0.862 0.904 0.631 0.904 0.848 0.897 0.556
Industry specific values of the percentage of firms that consider patents to be either somewhat or very important are reported in Table
2. All regressions include control variables: log GDP per capita, log GDP, log real exchange rate, log trade openness, legal system index,
country-industry pair FE, year FE, and country time trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
Focusing first on the results from the entire sample, the estimated interaction term coefficients
imply that an IP-related PTA is associated with a significant relative increase in both total and
non-related party offshoring in industries where patents are viewed as more important. The results
suggest that a one standard deviation increase in patent importance (10.23% of industry firms) is
associated with a relative increase of 11.9% (e0.011∗10.23 − 1) and 8.5% (e0.008∗10.23 − 1) in total and
non-related party offshoring respectively. Once again, we do not find evidence for a relative increase
in related party offshoring. Interestingly however, we do find marginally significant evidence that a
greater proportion of offshoring is conducted through related parties after reform among industries
where patents are more important.
Turning to the absolute effect of a PTA, the industry specific predicted marginal effect is
e(β̂2+β̂3·Pat. imp.%) − 1. Referencing the values reported in Table 2, the average patent importance
among industries included in the original Low and High-IP industry groupings are 8.08% and 25.25%
respectively. The results in column (1) indicate that an industry with a Pat. imp. % equal to that
16We explored specifications that allow for a non-linear relationship between offshoring and patent importance, but
did not find significant results.
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of the Low-IP group average experiences a 4.5% absolute decrease in total offshoring, while an
industry with the High-IP group average experiences a 15.3% absolute increase in total offshoring.
In accordance with our findings in Table 7, the results in column (4) imply that an industry with the
High-IP group average experiences a 2.57% decrease in the share of offshoring conducted through
non-related parties. For each set of regression estimates reported in Table 9, we calculate the implied
patent importance threshold where β̂2+β̂3·Pat. imp.% = 0, so that all industries with greater patent
importance than the threshold level are associated with an absolute increase in offshoring. The
estimated threshold for total offshoring reported in column (1) implies that all industries included in
the original High-IP classification (see Table 1) experience an absolute increase in offshoring, while
Low-IP industries experience a decrease. The lower estimated threshold for non-related offshoring
implies an absolute increase across a substantially broader range of industries. Once again, these
findings suggest that substantial increases in related party offshoring may be present only among
a narrower set of industries.
Before proceeding, note that similar to the main results, the estimates using the restricted
sample excluding US PTAs suggest a positive relative effect for all three types of reform. Although
statistical significance is weaker, we again find the largest relative effect for related party offshoring
and we do find some evidence for a compositional shift in offshoring towards related parties. The
estimated coefficient implies a one standard deviation increase in patent importance is associated
with a 24% relative increase in related party offshoring and an additional 1.5% of total offshoring
conducted through related parties. Across the board, we estimate a larger patent importance
threshold needed to imply a positive absolute increase in each type of offshoring compared to
the estimates with the entire sample. This implies a narrower set of industries that experience
an absolute increase in offshoring, consistent with our finding of a weaker absolute effect on US
offshoring from non-US PTAs from the primary specification.
Finally, we consider an empirical specification where we replace the PTA reform indicator
variable with a country-specific index of the strength of patent protection. This allows us to check
that our primary empirical results are effectively capturing the result of strengthened IPRs induced
by PTAs, rather than other policy changes included in the agreement. We utilize the widely
used Ginarte and Park (GP) index, which scores the strength of patent protection for each of our
sample countries from zero to five.17 Although the index covers a time period well beyond our
2002-2012 sample period, it is only updated every five years. For the purposes of this empirical
exercise, we linearly interpolate between five-year updates to maintain our annual panel structure
and lag the index five years to ensure that the index captures changes to patent strength from the
implementation of a PTA.18 All regressions use the primary High-IP classification as displayed in
Table 2.
Empirical results using the GP index are reported in Table 10 and largely echo our primary
results. Using the entire sample, we find strong evidence for both a relative and absolute increase
17The GP index is based on five individual components: patent coverage, duration of protection, enforcement
mechanisms, restrictions on patent rights, and membership in international treaties. See Park (2008).
18We examined different lag structures and found results to be similar.
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Table 10: Patent Index (GP)
All PTAs Exclude US PTAs
Total Related Non-Related %NR Total Related Non-Related %NR
Lagged GP 0.108 -0.085 0.151 2.221 0.038 -0.565 0.147 1.279
(0.171) (0.301) (0.213) (4.002) (0.328) (0.796) (0.480) (8.130)
Lagged GP x High-IP 0.288** 0.344 0.335** -0.280 0.491** 1.064** 0.511* -5.175
(0.107) (0.260) (0.128) (3.034) (0.182) (0.452) (0.252) (5.698)
P-Values for H0:
GP + GPxHigh = 0 0.023 0.258 0.024 0.606 0.167 0.309 0.159 0.543
Observations 4,465 3,683 4,429 4,465 2,499 1,897 2,471 2,499
R-squared 0.917 0.862 0.904 0.631 0.904 0.849 0.897 0.556
Lagged PI denotes a five year lag of the interpolated Ginarte and Park (1997) index of patent strength as discussed in the main text.
All regressions include control variables: log GDP per capita, log GDP, log real exchange rate, log trade openness, legal system index,
country-industry pair FE, year FE, and country time trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
in total and non-related party offshoring. We do not find significance evidence of an increase in
related party offshoring nor a compositional shift in offshoring. To get a sense of magnitudes,
we compare the relative increases in offshoring implied by these coefficient estimates to the cor-
responding primary estimates using the PTA-induced reform indicator. This comparison suggests
that the estimated relative increase in offshoring from a PTA is equivalent to an impact that would
be generated by a 1.25 and 0.97 increase in the GP index for total and non-related party offshoring
respectively. Given that the standard deviation in the GP index among countries in our sample is
0.68, this corresponds to a substantial IPR reform. To take one example, prior to the PTA between
Peru and the United States in 2009, the GP index for Peru was 2.9 and for the US was 4.9. Our
results suggest that the effect of an IP-related PTA is equivalent to an IPR reform that moves Peru
substantially closer to US standards. Finally, note that we continue to find evidence for a relative
increase in all three types of offshoring in the restricted sample, with the largest relative effect for
related party offshoring. We do not find significant evidence of an absolute increase in offshoring
in the restricted sample.
4.2 Timing of Changes to Offshoring
In this section, we examine the timing of changes to offshoring using an event study framework.
We normalize the date that each PTA enters into force to zero and regress each of our three measures
of offshoring on a set of dummies indicating the year relative to reform. We define the dummy
variable Post7+ to equal 1 beginning seven years after the PTA takes effect and in all subsequent
years. The variable Pre7- is defined analogously to equal one for all years at least seven years prior
to reform. All other dummy variables equal one only in the indicated year relative to reform. For
brevity, we only report results using the entire sample of PTAs in the main text. Our results using
the restricted sample excluding US PTAs are similar, and can be found in Appendix A.2.
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Table 11: Event Study Framework (All PTAs)
Pre1 Reference Year Pre2 Reference Year
Total Related Non-Related Total Related Non-Related
Pre7- 0.475 -0.117 0.117 0.283 -0.153 -0.007
Pre6 0.315 -0.039 0.040 0.122 -0.075 -0.084
Pre5 0.231 0.103 0.081 0.039 0.067 -0.044
Pre4 0.241 0.041 0.068 0.049 0.004 -0.057
Pre3 0.221 0.033 0.084 0.029 -0.003 -0.040
Pre2 0.192** 0.037 0.124 – – –
Pre1 – – – -0.192** -0.037 -0.124
Post0 0.005 0.130 0.107 -0.187 0.093 -0.017
Post1 -0.011 0.198 0.102 -0.203 0.162 -0.022
Post2 -0.130 0.240 0.056 -0.322 0.203 -0.069
Post3 -0.088 0.124 0.149 -0.281 0.088 0.024
Post4 -0.143 0.165 0.170 -0.335 0.128 0.045
Post5 -0.053 0.195 0.368 -0.245 0.158 0.244
Post6 -0.224 0.224 0.257 -0.416 0.188 0.133
Post7+ -0.200 0.467 0.308 -0.392 0.430 0.183
Pre7- x High-IP -0.284 -0.449 -0.314 0.021 -0.211 -0.085
Pre6 x High-IP -0.274*** -0.571** -0.191 0.031 -0.333 0.039
Pre5 x High-IP -0.374** -0.629*** -0.398** -0.068 -0.391** -0.168
Pre4 x High-IP -0.310** -0.483** -0.305** -0.005 -0.245 -0.076
Pre3 x High-IP -0.287** -0.353** -0.216 0.018 -0.115 0.013
Pre2 x High-IP -0.305*** -0.238 -0.230** – – –
Pre1 x High-IP – – – 0.305*** 0.238 0.230**
Post0 x High-IP 0.001 -0.220 -0.017 0.306** 0.018 0.213*
Post1 x High-IP 0.005 -0.154 0.062 0.310** 0.085 0.290**
Post2 x High-IP 0.247** -0.068 0.201 0.552*** 0.171 0.431***
Post3 x High-IP 0.133 0.228 0.150 0.438*** 0.466** 0.380**
Post4 x High-IP 0.218* 0.162 0.152 0.523*** 0.400 0.381**
Post5 x High-IP 0.156 0.228 0.090 0.461*** 0.466 0.318*
Post6 x High-IP 0.393*** 0.225 0.362** 0.698*** 0.464 0.592***
Post7+ x High-IP 0.439*** 0.286 0.371*** 0.744*** 0.524 0.601***
Observations 4,465 3,683 4,429 4,465 3,683 4,429
R-squared 0.916 0.858 0.901 0.916 0.858 0.901
Pre7- equals one for 7 years prior to reform and all proceeding years. Post7+ equals one for 7 years after
reform and all subsequent years. Pre1 and Pre1xHigh-IP are omitted to serve as the reference point in
columns 1-3, Pre2 and Pre2xHigh-IP are omitted in columns 4-6. All regressions include control variables:
log GDP per capita, log GDP, log real exchange rate, log trade openness, legal system index, country-
industry pair FE, and year FE. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are omitted. *** p
< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
The first three columns of Table 11 display estimates for event study regressions with a depen-
dent variable of the log of total, related, and non-related party respectively using the year prior to
reform (Pre1) as the omitted reference group. This aligns with our primary specification, where
the year of reform is included in the post reform period. Similar to our main results, the estimated
coefficients on the period dummies imply that we do not detect any significant effect of PTAs on any
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of the three types of offshoring in Low-IP industries.19 To understand what our results imply for
the effect on offshoring in High-IP industries, consider the estimated coefficients on our interaction
terms in column one where the dependent variable is the log of total offshoring intensity. Note that
the estimated coefficients in the pre-reform period are negative and statistically significant two to
six years prior to reform. This implies significantly lower total offshoring in High-IP industries,
relative to Low-IP industries, compared to the omitted reference point of one year prior to reform.
Importantly however, the point estimates in the pre-reform period exhibit no clear trend and
remain in a tight range of [−0.374,−0.274]. In other words, our results are consistent with a
stable pre-reform trend in relative total offshoring between Low-IP and High-IP industries, and a
significant departure from that trend beginning one year prior to reform. This finding provides
strong evidence that the increases in offshoring that we estimate in our main results are driven
by PTA related reforms, rather than reflecting a continuation of a pre-existing trend in offshoring
at the industry level. This is most easily seen visually in Panel (a) of Figure 5, which plots the
interaction term estimated coefficients of column one together with 95% confidence intervals. Note
the clear departure from pre-reform trend to the level of the omitted reference point of one year
prior to reform, the increasing trend following reform, and the eventual statistically significant
increase above the reference point beginning six years post reform. Thus, we find evidence for a
significant, one-year anticipatory effect of IP-related PTAs on total offshoring in High-IP industries
when the entire sample is considered. We view this as a reasonable finding given that PTAs
typically involve lengthy negations before they are finalized and often allow for a grace period
before regulatory standards, including IPRs, officially enter into force. Our findings also mirror the
significant anticipatory effects of regional free trade agreements found in Magee (2008) and Mölders
and Volz (2011).
To better incorporate the anticipatory effect of PTAs in our analysis, we also report estimates of
our event study regressions in columns 4-6 of Table 11 using a reference point of two years prior to
reform (Pre2), the last year consistent with the estimated pre-reform trend. The relative increase
total offshoring in High-IP industries estimated in column 4 is illustrated in Figure 5, Panel (b).
Note that the point estimates of the interaction term coefficients are simply translated up by the
estimated anticipatory effect of the PTA. That is, the estimated coefficients of the Pre1xHigh-
IP interaction term indicate a 35.7% and 25.9% relative increase in total and non-related party
offshoring in High-IP industries one year prior to the PTA entering into force, compared to the
omitted two years prior to reform (Pre2) reference. Our results imply the magnitude of these
increases continues to grow over time. Two years after the PTA enters into force, our estimates
suggest an overall (including anticipatory effect) relative increase of 73.7% and 53.9% total and
non-related party offshoring. In the period at least seven years after reform, we estimate an overall
relative increase of 110% and 82.4% respectively. On the other hand, we are unable to detect a
significant absolute increase for any particular year or type of offshoring. Although point estimates
19In the Appendix, we also show that we observe no significant effect of reform when we estimate regressions that
do not include interaction terms and thus do not distinguish between Low-IP and High-IP industries.
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Figure 5: Event Study: Total Offshoring (All PTAs)
(a) Pre1 Reference Year (b) Pre2 Reference Year
Figure 5 plots the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms on columns 1 and 4 of Table 11, where the
dependent variable is log total offshoring. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
for the sum of coefficients on Post-Year and Post-YearxHigh-IP are uniformly positive, the large
standard errors associated with the Post-Year estimated coefficients prevent us from concluding
that this sum is significantly different from zero. Consistent with our primary results, we do not
find evidence for any significant effect of PTAs on related party offshoring when the entire sample
is considered.20
5 Conclusion
The TRIPS agreement created an intense debate among scholars and policy makers on the costs
and benefits of IPR reforms in developing countries. The debate continued in the post-TRIPS era
with the implementation of TRIPS-plus provisions in the context of bilateral and multilateral PTAs.
The expansion of negotiations from the multilateral WTO platform to the multilateral/bilateral
PTA platform signifies the ongoing complexity and importance of IPRs protection policies for
cross-border transactions.
In this paper, we contribute to this debate by conducting an empirical analysis that investigates
the effects of IP-Related PTAs on US offshoring behavior. We focus on three measures of US
offshoring at the intra-industry level: total offshoring intensity, related party and non-related party
offshoring intensities. We find that IP-Related PTAs exert a positive and substantial impact on
all three measures of offshoring in High-IP industries relative to Low-IP industries. In our sample
of 25 IP-Related PTAs, our estimates imply that PTA-induced IPR reform in developing countries
20We also examined event study regressions using the percentage of offshoring conducted through non-related
parties as the dependent variable. Again consistent with our main results, we did not find significant evidence for a
compositional effect of PTA-induced reform.
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is associated with a relative increase in total offshoring intensity between 39.8 and 45.2 percent,
related party offshoring intensity between 36.1 and 53.9 percent, and non-related party offshoring
between 30.0 and 39.1 percent. This differential impact of PTAs for High-IP industries is consistent
with the hypothesis that industries that make heavy use of patents respond relatively strongly to
PTA-induced IPR reform.
Our analysis makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, we study the impact
of PTA-induced IPR reform on the offshoring activity of US multinational firms. By decomposing
the intra-industry offshoring measures into related and non-related party components, we are able
to examine how these reforms affect both the scale and composition of US offshoring. We thus differ
from existing literature that exclusively focuses on the effects of IP-Related PTAs on trade flows
[see: Maskus and Ridley (2016), Ridley (2018) and Campi and Dueñas (2019)]. Second, we address
the challenges of identifying the offshoring effects of PTA-induced IPR reform by implementing
a variety of recent econometric methods from the literature. In particular, we incorporate the
identification strategy of Ridley (2018), event-study techniques similar to Branstetter et al. (2006)
and Ivus and Park (2019), and country-year fixed effects regressions in the spirit of Bilir (2014)
and Maskus and Yang (2018). Third, we use a novel indicator, the continuous patent-importance
measure based on NSF surveys, in order to classify industries as High-IP and Low-IP. The use of
this continuous measure also allows us to depart from the standard binary industry classification
in alternate regressions. Finally, we compare the magnitude of our primary results to estimates
obtained using the standard Ginarte and Park index of patent protection. This exercise suggests
that PTA-induced IPR reform is equivalent to a major domestic IPR reform in terms of its impact
on in US offshoring.
From a policy perspective, our paper sheds light on the question of whether increased IPRs
protection in developing countries leads to more cross-border activity and whether that increased
activity takes place within the boundaries of the MNF or extends to unrelated domestic parties.
Our paper sides with the literature that finds that increased IPRs protection leads to the increased
cross-border activity, in this case higher levels of offshoring intensity (Branstetter et al., 2006, 2011;
Delgado et al., 2013; Canals and Şener, 2014; Naghavi et al., 2015; Klein, 2018; Ivus et al., 2017)
However, similar to the bulk of this literature, we find that the increase in offshoring associated with
PTA-induced IPR reform is confined to High-IP industries, and does not apply across the board.
We find that both related party and non-related party offshoring intensities increase substantially
in response to PTA-induced IPR reform. Moreover, both intensities increase roughly in the same
proportion. Although we find some evidence for a modest shift towards related party offshoring
following reform, we do not observe a major change in the share of either type of offshoring in
total offshoring. Policy makers might be concerned that increased international transactions driven
by PTAs may exclusively materialize within the boundaries of the MNF and not through arm’s
length subcontracting to domestic firms. Such an outcome could indeed imply limited technology
spillovers to the domestic economy. Our results alleviate such concerns.
Our empirical work can be extended in several directions to provide a more comprehensive
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assessment of the effects of IP-related PTAs. First, our analysis considers a particular subset of
IP-related PTAs that include a developing country and either the US, EU or EFTA as a signatory.
We have argued that this somewhat narrow focus allows us to isolate the impact of meaningful
PTA-induced reform on a key potential benefit from this reform in developing countries, namely
US offshoring. Future work can examine how these results generalize to a broader sample of IP-
related PTAs and investigate the responsiveness of offshoring from countries other than the US.
Second, one can use firm-level data to study the impact of PTA-induced IPR reform on firm-specific
measures such as licensing fees, royalty payments, R&D investment etc. (see Bilir (2014), Ivus and
Park (2019), and Branstetter et al. (2006)). Third, one can analyze additional effects of these
reforms on the domestic economy including their consequences for consumers, wages, employment,
domestic innovation, and institutional implementation costs. In our view, understanding each of
these potential effects is essential to a full analysis of whether developing countries ultimately
benefit from IP-related PTAs
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Appendix A
A.1 Constructing the Offshoring Measure
To construct our measure of offshoring between related and non-related parties, we match two
different datasets. First, we use IO tables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis from 2002 to 2012
(use of commodities by industries, after redefinitions) and related trade data collected by the US
Census Bureau from the U. S. customs declarations for the same time period.
Manufacturing industries for IO tables are classified according to Table A1.1 (total of 20 indus-
tries), and for the US Census Bureau are classified according to Table A1.2 (total of 22 industries).
We match both datasets and end up with a total of 19 industries. Details regarding the final match-
ing are given in Table A1.3. As discussed in Section 2, we construct the following three distinct
offshoring measures for each industry, country, year triplet (offshoring intensity between related
parties, between non-related parties and total):
ORict = aiit ·
MRict
Cit
ONRict = aiit ·
MNRict
Cit





We obtain the aiit coefficient from IO tables that indicate the dollar value of inputs that in-
dustry i gets from this same industry to produce one dollar worth of i output at time t. For the
transportation equipment industry (which combines two industries from IO data) we simply add
up columns and rows to obtain the final aiit coefficient. We also obtain the total consumption
of industry i at time t in the U.S economy (Cit) from IO tables, again summing up the rows of
the two industries that form the final equipment industry. We use the US Census Bureau data
to obtain MRict, which is the total imports of industry i from country c at time t that takes place
within the boundaries of the firm, and MNRict , which is the total imports that take place outside
the boundaries of the firm. As we did with the IO data, for final industries that are composed of
more than one industry in the original US Census data, we sum the imports to obtain imports in
the final industry.
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Table A1.1: BEA Input Output Tables 2002-2012
IO Code Commodities/Industries
321 Wood products
327 Nonmetallic mineral products
331 Primary metals
332 Fabricated metal products
333 Machinery
334 Computer and electronic products
3361MV Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts
3364OT Other transportation equipment
337 Furniture and related products
339 Miscellaneous manufacturing
311FT Food and beverage and tobacco products
313TT Textile mills and textile product mills
315AL Apparel and leather and allied products
322 Paper products
323 Printing and related support activities
324 Petroleum and coal products
325 Chemical products
326 Plastics and rubber products
511 Publishing industries, except internet (includes software)
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
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Table A1.2: US Census Bureau bilateral related and non-related
party imports data
NAICS Code Industries
311 Food and kindred products
312 Beverages and tobacco products
313 Textiles and fabrics
314 Textile mill products
315 Apparel and accessories
316 Leather and allied products
321 Wood products
322 Paper
323 Printed matter and related products, nesoi
324 Petroleum and coal products
325 Chemicals
326 Plastics and rubber products
327 Nonmetallic mineral products
331 Primary metal mfg
332 Fabricated metal products, nesoi
333 Machinery, except electrical
334 Computer and electronic products
335 Electrical equipment, appliances and components
336 Transportation equipment
337 Furniture and fixtures
339 Miscellaneous manufactured commodities
511 Newspapers, books, and other published matter, nesoi
Source: US Census Bureau.
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Table A1.3: Final matched industries
New code IO Code NAICS Code Name
1 311FT 311, 312 Food and kindred products
2 313TT 313, 314 Textile products
3 315AL 315, 316 Apparel and accessories
4 321 321 Wood products
5 322 322 Paper products
6 323 323 Printing and related activities
7 324 324 Petroleum and coal products
8 325 325 Chemicals
9 326 326 Plastics and rubber products
10 327 327 Nonmetallic mineral products
11 331 331 Primary metals
12 332 332 Fabricated metal products
13 333 333 Machinery
14 334 334 Computer and electronic products
15 335 335 Electrical equipment
16 3361MV, 336OT 336 Transportation equipment
17 337 337 Furniture and related products
18 339 339 Miscellaneous manufacturing
19 511 511 Publishing
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A.2 Additional Event Study Regressions
In this subsection, we report the results of several event study regressions that were omitted
from the main text. Table A2.1 displays results from event study regressions using the restricted
sample of non-US PTAs using both one and two year prior to reform as the reference year. As
before, we plot the coefficient estimates corresponding to the relative effect of the PTA on total
offshoring in High-IP industries in Figure A2.1. Note that our estimates remain consistent with
a stable pre-reform trend in total offshoring in the restricted sample. While we continue to find
some evidence for an anticipatory effect of PTA reform on total and non-related party offshoring,
the associated point estimates are only statistically significant at the 10% level and smaller than
the corresponding estimates using the entire sample. We view this as an intuitive result given that
US enterprises are likely better able to anticipate the implementation of a PTA that includes the
US as a signatory. Including the anticipatory effect in panel (b), we begin to a detect an overall
significant relative increase in High-IP industries of 77.7% two years after reform that grows to
a peak of 185% six years after reform. Mirroring our primary results, we also find a significant
relative increases in related party and non-related party offshoring beginning three and five years
post reform respectively. Once again, we find the largest relative increase in related party offshoring
in the restricted sample. As in our results using the entire sample of PTAs, we are unable to detect
a significant absolute effect on any type of offshoring in the event study framework.
Figure A2.1: Event Study: Total Offshoring (Exclude US PTAs)
(a) Pre1 Reference Year (b) Pre2 Reference Year
Figure A2.1 plots the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms on columns 1 and 4 of Table A2.1, where
the dependent variable is log total offshoring. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Table A2.1: Event Study Framework (Exclude US PTAs)
Pre1 Reference Year Pre2 Reference Year
Total Related Non-Related Total Related Non-Related
Pre7- 1.071 1.743 0.895 0.740 1.640 0.620
Pre6 0.605 1.079 0.530 0.274 0.976 0.255
Pre5 0.394 0.999 0.386 0.063 0.896 0.112
Pre4 0.426 0.915 0.324 0.095 0.811* 0.049
Pre3 0.338 0.482 0.221 0.008 0.379 -0.053
Pre1 – – – -0.331** -0.104 -0.274**
Pre2 0.331** 0.104 0.274** – – –
Post0 -0.116 -0.219 -0.003 -0.447 -0.323 -0.277
Post1 -0.082 -0.525 -0.057 -0.413 -0.629 -0.332
Post2 -0.426 -0.714 -0.344 -0.757 -0.818 -0.619
Post3 -0.482 -1.089 -0.369 -0.813 -1.193 -0.643
Post4 -0.673 -1.027 -0.516 -1.003 -1.131 -0.791
Post5 -0.505 -1.193 -0.237 -0.836 -1.297 -0.512
Post6 -1.019 -1.879 -0.642 -1.350 -1.982 -0.917
Post7+ -0.830 -1.530 -0.511 -1.161 -1.633 -0.785
Pre7- x High-IP -0.452* -0.932*** -0.462** -0.175 -0.912** -0.236
Pre6 x High-IP -0.232* -0.503 -0.201 0.045 -0.483 0.025
Pre5 x High-IP -0.223 -0.423* -0.328 -0.054 -0.403* -0.101
Pre4 x High-IP -0.138 -0.337 -0.188 -0.139 -0.317 0.038
Pre3 x High-IP -0.228* -0.269 -0.162 0.049 -0.249 0.064
Pre2 x High-IP -0.277* -0.020 -0.227* – – –
Pre1 x High-IP – – – 0.277* 0.020 0.227*
Post0 x High-IP 0.017 -0.013 0.001 0.294* 0.007 0.228
Post1 x High-IP -0.179 0.182 -0.109 0.098 0.202 0.117
Post2 x High-IP 0.299 0.344 0.169 0.575** 0.364 0.396
Post3 x High-IP 0.266 0.804** 0.175 0.543** 0.824** 0.401
Post4 x High-IP 0.442** 0.726* 0.378 0.719*** 0.746* 0.604**
Post5 x High-IP 0.413** 1.262*** 0.185 0.690*** 1.282*** 0.412
Post6 x High-IP 0.772*** 1.536*** 0.623*** 1.049*** 1.556*** 0.849***
Post7+ x High-IP 0.726*** 1.471* 0.629*** 1.003*** 1.491* 0.856***
Observations 2,499 1,897 2,471 2,499 1,897 2,471
R-squared 0.902 0.847 0.894 0.902 0.847 0.894
Pre7- equals one for 7 years prior to reform and all proceeding years. Post7+ equals one for 7 years after
reform and all subsequent years. Pre1 and Pre1xHigh-IP are omitted to serve as the reference point in
columns 1-3, Pre2 and Pre2xHigh-IP are omitted in columns 4-6. All regressions include control variables:
log GDP per capita, log GDP, log real exchange rate, log trade openness, legal system index, country-
industry pair FE, and year FE. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are omitted. *** p
< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
Tables A2.2 and A2.3 report results from event study regressions without including the period
dummy, High-IP interaction term. As in our primary results, we do not detect a significant effect
of PTA-induced IPR reform when we do not distinguish between High-IP and Low-IP industries.
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Table A2.2: Event Study Framework - No interaction Terms (All PTAs)
Pre1 Reference Year Pre2 Reference Year
Total Related Non-Related Total Related Non-Related
Pre7- 0.337 -0.304 -0.033 0.281 -0.232 -0.054
Pre6 0.189 -0.289 -0.048 0.134 -0.217 -0.070
Pre5 0.060 -0.168 -0.102 0.004 -0.096 -0.123
Pre4 0.101 -0.163 -0.070 0.045 -0.091 -0.091
Pre3 0.091 -0.123 -0.014 0.035 -0.051 -0.035
Pre2 0.056 -0.072 0.021 – – –
Pre1 – – – -0.056 0.072 -0.021
Post0 0.007 0.023 0.102 -0.048 0.095 0.080
Post1 -0.006 0.121 0.130 -0.062 0.193 0.109
Post2 -0.016 0.201 0.148 -0.072 0.273 0.127
Post3 -0.024 0.230 0.219 -0.080 0.301 0.219
Post4 -0.042 0.229 0.240 -0.098 0.301 0.219
Post5 -0.023 0.285 0.413 -0.033 0.357 0.391
Post6 -0.047 0.314 0.418 -0.103 0.385 0.397
Post7+ 0.002 0.589 0.478 -0.054 0.660 0.457
Observations 4,465 3,683 4,429 4,465 3,683 4,429
R-squared 0.915 0.857 0.901 0.915 0.857 0.901
Within R-squared 0.013 0.006 0.016 0.013 0.006 0.016
Pre7- equals one for 7 years prior to reform and all proceeding years. Post7+ equals one for 7
years after reform and all subsequent years. Columns (1)-(3) use one year prior to reform as the
reference point, columns (4)-(6) use two years prior to reform. All regressions include control
variables: log GDP per capita, log GDP, log real exchange rate, log trade openness, legal system
index, country-industry pair FE, and year FE. Robust standard errors clustered at the country
level are omitted. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A2.3: Event Study Framework - No Interaction Terms (Exclude US PTAs)
Pre1 Reference Year Pre2 Reference Year
Total Related Non-Related Total Related Non-Related
Pre7- 0.824 1.243 0.636 0.624 1.148 0.471
Pre6 0.474 0.801 0.406 0.274 0.705 0.242
Pre5 0.268 0.784 0.208 0.068 0.688 0.044
Pre4 0.342 0.753 0.214 0.142 0.657 0.050
Pre3 0.223 0.347 0.133 0.023 0.252 -0.031
Pre2 0.200* 0.096 0.164 – – –
Pre1 – – – -0.200* -0.096 -0.164
Post0 -0.105 -0.206 0.002 -0.305 -0.302 -0.162
Post1 -0.149 -0.396 -0.090 -0.348 -0.492 -0.255
Post2 -0.271 -0.491 -0.246 -0.471 -0.587 -0.410
Post3 -0.340 -0.600 -0.263 -0.539 -0.695 -0.428
Post4 -0.447 -0.579 -0.313 -0.647 -0.674 -0.477
Post5 -0.283 -0.456 -0.112 -0.483 -0.552 -0.277
Post6 -0.636 -0.982 -0.318 -0.836 -1.078 -0.483
Post7+ -0.453 -0.629 -0.167 -0.653 -0.724 -0.331
Observations 2,499 1,897 2,471 2,499 1,897 2,471
R-squared 0.901 0.842 0.892 0.901 0.842 0.892
Within R-squared 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.018 0.019 0.020
Pre7- equals one for 7 years prior to reform and all proceeding years. Post7+ equals one for 7
years after reform and all subsequent years. Columns (1)-(3) use one year prior to reform as the
reference point, columns (4)-(6) use two years prior to reform. All regressions include control
variables: log GDP per capita, log GDP, log real exchange rate, log trade openness, legal system
index, country-industry pair FE, and year FE. Robust standard errors clustered at the country
level are omitted. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
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A.3 Additional Robustness
In the main estimation sample, we dropped all observations for which some data was missing for
any of the controls included in Hct in (3.1). Even though (3.2) includes country-year controls, which
absorb all variation at the country level, all estimates were based on the main estimation sample
for consistency. In Table A3.1 and A3.2, we report estimates when we exclude the Hct controls.
The corresponding estimation sample includes all observations for which the associated offshoring
dependent variable is present. This expanded estimation sample incorporates a maximum of about
300 additional observations. Table A3.1 displays estimates of regression specification (3.1) without
including the Hct controls. Table A3.2 displays estimates from this same expanded sample when
country-year pair fixed effects are included. All estimates remain consistent with our primary
results.
Table A3.1: Country Controls (Hct) Excluded
All PTAs Exclude US PTAs
Total Related Non-Related %NR Total Related Non-Related %NR
PTA -0.128 -0.103 -0.147 -1.056 -0.112 -0.217 -0.124 -1.304
(0.089) (0.133) (0.102) (1.479) (0.126) (0.229) (0.143) (2.290)
PTA x High-IP 0.323*** 0.378* 0.296*** -2.082 0.275** 0.741*** 0.255* -2.706
(0.087) (0.187) (0.085) (2.012) (0.124) (0.232) (0.130) (2.352)
Observations 4,753 3,832 4,711 4,753 2,787 2,046 2,753 2,787
R-squared 0.912 0.856 0.900 0.615 0.894 0.836 0.888 0.529
All regressions include country-specific time trends, industry-country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard
errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
Table A3.2: Country Controls (Hct) Excluded, Country-Year Fixed Effects Included
All PTAs Exclude US PTAs
Total Related Non-Related %NR Total Related Non-Related %NR
PTA x High-IP 0.331*** 0.381** 0.300*** -1.972 0.287** 0.757*** 0.258* -2.545
(0.086) (0.184) (0.086) (2.006) (0.124) (0.225) (0.131) (2.354)
Observations 4,753 3,830 4,711 4,753 2,787 2,044 2,753 2,787
R-squared 0.916 0.865 0.905 0.634 0.900 0.847 0.895 0.552
All regressions include industry-country and country-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level
in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
Next, we examine regression results when we remove publishing from the industries included
in the estimation sample. According to the NAICS definition, publishing incorporates all entities
responsible for the production of copies of works in print or CD-ROM form, including software. In
this way, it occupies a grey area between a traditional manufacturing industry and a traditional
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service industry. In the main sample, we include publishing in the estimation sample to err on
the side of completeness. However, due to a high occurrence of observations with zero recorded
offshoring intensity in publishing, publishing accounts for a relatively small proportion of obser-
vations in our main estimation sample. This implies that although including publishing increases
our total number of observations, it also increases our incidence of missing observations. Here, we
briefly demonstrate that our primary results are robust to removing publishing from the estimation
sample.
Tables A3.3 and A3.4 display results from regressions using the expanded sample (country
controls Hct excluded) without publishing. We note that this sample exhibits our lowest incidence
of missing observations. For example, when examining total offshoring intensity and all PTAs, the
4,702 observations in this sample constitutes 95% of the maximum possible 4,950 observations (18
industries x 25 countries x 11 years) if no missing data were present. Excluding US PTAs, the
sample of 2,760 observations constitutes 93% of a maximum 2,970 observations (18 industries x 15
countries x 11 years).
Table A3.3: Country Controls (Hct) Excluded, Publishing Removed
All PTAs Exclude US PTAs
Total Related Non-Related %NR Total Related Non-Related %NR
PTA -0.128 -0.123 -0.134 -1.130 -0.118 -0.236 -0.114 -1.560
(0.086) (0.134) (0.105) (1.483) (0.120) (0.229) (0.147) (2.269)
PTA x High-IP 0.321*** 0.390*** 0.288*** -1.988 0.271* 0.752*** 0.244* -2.502
(0.089) (0.188) (0.086) (1.992) (0.127) (0.232) (0.133) (2.307)
Observations 4,702 3,816 4,663 4,702 2,760 2,044 2,727 2,760
R-squared 0.911 0.856 0.899 0.618 0.894 0.836 0.888 0.529
All regressions include country-specific time trends, industry-country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the country level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
Table A3.4: Country Controls (Hct) Excluded, Publishing Removed, Country-Year Fixed Effects Included
All PTAs Exclude US PTAs
Total Related Non-Related %NR Total Related Non-Related %NR
PTA x High-IP 0.328*** 0.391** 0.292*** -1.912 0.282** 0.765*** 0.248* -2.385
(0.088) (0.186) (0.087) (1.996) (0.127) (0.226) (0.133) (2.320)
Observations 4,702 3,814 4,663 4,702 2,760 2,042 2,727 2,760
R-squared 0.915 0.865 0.904 0.636 0.899 0.847 0.894 0.552
All regressions include industry-country and country-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level
in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<0.1
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